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---
title: "The strongest argument for banning open-weights models? Written in 1907"
date: 2026-07-20
url: "https://x.com/ccatalini/status/2079257647669530637"
tags: [ai-agi, policy]
deck: "Theodore Vail’s case against ‘destructive competition’ — and the 1956 consent decree that proved the opposite. Same candor, a century apart."
image: "/images/notes/banning-open-weights-1907.jpg"
tweetCount: 5
likes: 18
reposts: 2
---
The strongest argument for banning open-weights models? Written in 1907. Theodore Vail had just retaken AT&T and declared competition a waste:
"Universal Service, One system, One policy" was the only  way to guarantee a return on capital.

Vail: "Duplication of plant is a waste to the investor; duplication of charges is a waste to the user." [...] "The public [...] has never benefited by destructive competition."
[@deanwball](https://x.com/deanwball): "open-weight models obviously deter ai capex."

Same candor, a century apart.

Vail's ask? Regulation. Washington obliged, for decades.

Then came the 1956 antitrust consent decree.
AT&T was forced to license every patent royalty-free, transistor included, and stay out of computing. The innovation gains? Driven by young firms outside AT&T's original markets. (H/T [@Watzinger](https://x.com/Watzinger))

The irony is you get neither closed nor open models without antitrust forcing AT&T's hand.

Worrying about who funds the next training run concedes the point: the value of foundational infrastructure accrues downstream. It always does.
